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NOTES
POWER OF A STATE TO PREFER LOCAL CREDITORS OF AN INSOL-
VENT AS TO PROPERTY WITHIN THE STATE-In the administration of
the property of an insolvent the question presents itself as to how far
a state in which property is located may discriminate in favor of
creditors, solely because they are its citizens. The consideration of
this problem will be approached from two points of view, first, as a
pure problem of conflict of laws, and second, to determine to what
extent the problem is controlled by the Constitution of the United
States and Bankruptcy Acts passed in pursuance thereof.
I. A Problem in Conflict of Laws
The laws of governments have no force beyond their territorial
limits, and if applied in the courts of another state, it is upon a princi-
ple of comity, which ceases to operate if the law conflicts with the
public policy of the second state.1 It follows that receivers 2 appointed
by one jurisdiction are not entitled as of right to recognition in other
jurisdictions.8 Yet an adjudication of insolvency is in effect an order
'For an interesting application of this problem, where the Italian court
threatened reprisals if the New Jersey court would not recognize its decrees
see Caruso v. Caruso, 143 Ad. 77i (N. J. 1928) ; Beale, Coiflicd of Laws (1919)
33 HARv. L. Rav. i and (ig9o) 34 HARv. L. REv. so; K NT, COMmENTAPUMS
(4th ed. z86o) 4o6; Lorenzen, Territoriaity, Public Policy and te Cfo,lict of
Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. 3. 736.
2 The receiver is but an officer of the court, from which he derives his
appointment and his possession is the possession of the court for the benefit of
whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled to its possession. IoE,
REcMEs (4th ed. 1876) §§ 134, 139.
'Atkins v. Wabash, 29 Fed. I61 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1886); Irwin v. Granite
Ass'n, 56 N. I. Eq. 244, 38 Atl. 68o (i8g) ; Frowert v. Blank, so5 Pa. 299, 54
AUt. iooo ([903).
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that the insolvent place all his property in the hands of an assignee for
equal distribution among his creditors, and it would seem to be as
much the duty of the tribunals of other states to lend their aid to
carry out the design, as it would be to enforce any other just and
legal foreign judgment or decree.4
The problem is well stated by Chief Justice Parker in Dawes v.
Head: 5 "What shall be done to avoid on the one hand the injustice of
taking the whole fund for the use of our citizens, to the prejudice of
foreigners when the estate is insolvent, and on the other, the equal
injustice and greater inconvenience of compelling our own citizens to
seek satisfaction of their debts in distant countries ?"
According to the earlier English cases, a foreign assignee was
recognized and all property turned over to him.8 In ex parte Blake,"
where it appeared that the American courts had not recognized an
English assignment Lord Thurlow said, "I had no idea of any country
refusing to take notice of the assignee under our laws"; and equally
certain was Lord Robertson in Selkrig v. Davies,8 declaring that in
every country where the true principles of international law are under-
stood, the assignee's title to all property would be recognized. The
true test arises in cases where the insolvent has been adjudged bank-
rupt in two jurisdictions, or where it appears that creditors resident in
the state where the insolvency proceedings are had, will be preferred
to foreign creditors when all the assets are marshalled by the assignee.
In Steins Case,' Lord Fry considered three solutions. First, that
every forum yield to that of the domicile. Second, that every forum
yield to the first that adjudicates the debtor bankrupt. Third, that
the forum administer assets locally situated, allowing all creditors,
wherever resident, to prove but considering what had been paid in
other jurisdictions to creditors proving in order to produce equality
among all.
In the later case of Grimshaw v. Galbraith,° a foreign seqftestra-
tion was not allowed to prevail over a mere garnishee order in Eng-
land, while in re Macfadyen 11 an imperial statute vesting in the
Indian trustee all the property of the bankrupt whether in India or
elsewhere seems to have been entirely ignored.12 The subject is so
'People v. Granite State Provident Ass'ns, 16I N. Y. 492, 55 X. E. 1053
(igoo) ; Perkins v. Clear Spring Co., 17 Phila. 168, x69 (Pa. 1886). Cf: Booth
v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 328 (U. S. 1854) Wayne, J., "We think that a receiver
could not be admitted to the comity extended to judgment creditors without an
entire departure from chancery proceedings."
r3 Pick. I28, 147 (Mass. x825).
'3 PIGGOIT, FOE IMG JUDGMENTS AND JURISDICMION (1910) 98.
x Cox Eq. 398 (Eng. 1787).
'L. R. I5 Eq. 383 (1873).
91 Rose 462 (Eng. 182).
10 [igiao x K. B. 339.
1 [igo8] i K. B. 675.
'See .BATY, PRiVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1914) 98.
little covered by decisions that the present English law in this respect
cannot be stated with certainty.
13
The great diversity of ideas prevailing in different countries
makes the question of jurisdiction a difficult one. It has been sug-
gested 14 that the assumption of jurisdiction by a foreign country
ought to be recognized as long as it is not unreasonable, but for a
court to waive its jurisdiction because a foreign court has already
acquired jurisdiction of the matter requires great confidence in the law
and procedure of that country.
In the United States the courts from the outset have usually
refused to recognize foreign assignees, and it was early decided that
personal property of an English bankrupt in the United States might
be held by attachment to satisfy the claims of American creditors.1 5
The chief reason for departing from the English doctrine was the
hardship of compelling American creditors to go to England when
such creditors, presumably, had extended credit to the bankrupt rely-
ing on his property in the United States."
The doctrine thus established was adopted when similar questions
arose between states, and it soon became well-established law, that for
purposes of attachment, an assignment in insolvency under state laws
had no extra-territorial effect, at least as against attachments made by
citizens of the state in which the property was located If the at-
tachment was made by a creditor from a state where the insolvency
proceedings were had, or by a creditor from some other state, a dis-
tinction was made by most courts and such creditor was denied the
rights which were accorded the citizens of the state where the property
was situated s It was customary, therefore, for the local courts to
appoint an ancillary receiver for the protection of local creditors,"'
and on the whole, the state courts recognized each other's decrees
except in so far as they contravened the policy of the lex fori. It
seems, however, that every time local citizens were involved, a public
: LoR EZEN, CAsES ON CoxmcCT OF LAws (2d ed. x924) 989.
3 PiGaovr, op. cit. suproz note 6, at 123.
25 Milne v. Morton, 6 Birm. 353 (Pa. 1814).
" Burk v. McClain, i Harris and McHenry 236 (Md. 1766); Taylor v.
Geary, i Kirby 313 (Conn. 1787) ; Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289 (U. S.
.1o9).
1 Taylor v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 Allen 354 (Mass. x867) ; h; re Waite,
99 N. Y. 433, 2 N. E. 44o (1885).
"'May v. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 551, 13 N. E. 8o6 (1887) ; Burlock
v. Taylor, 16 Pick. 335 (Mass. 1835) ; Bagby v. Atlantic M. & 0. R. R. Co., 86
Pa. 291 (1878); contra: Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196 (1876); Warner v.
Jaifray, 96 N. Y. 248 (188y). See Bailey, An Assigunwtt inz Iwotvelcy
(1893) 7 HAav. L. R. 281.
Ramsay v. Ramsay, 97 Ill. App. 270 (19o) ; in re Middleby, 249 Pa. 2o3,
94 At!. Sso (97 5).
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policy 10 was invoked requiring local assets to be administered at least
to the extent of giving the local citizens a pro rata share of the total
assets wherever situated.21  In the earlier cases the constitutional
problem, which will be discussed in the next section, was little con-
sidered.
The tendency, in modern times in this country, which can be
gathered from local statutes,22 is in line with a pro rata settlement
basis. This trend is, of course, to be commended, for, in some
measure, "it is yielding much not to appropriate local assets to the
prior [complete] satisfaction of local creditors." 2 3 While in the
absence of constitutional provisions or treaty stipulations a state may
handle the property of a bankrupt within its jurisdiction as it desires,24
this much would seem equitable and economically advisable, that this
power ought not to be exercised to give local creditors any superior
right in case the estate as a whole is insolvent. Such action by legis-
latures militates against that fundamental principle in the administra-
tion of insolvents' estates, that "equality is equity." 25
IL Constitutional and Statutory Limitations
In the final analysis, laws relating to insolvents' estates are not
poor debtors' laws, but amount rather to a commercial regulation for
the benefit of society in general.28  It was to be expected therefore
that since "commerce knows no state laws," the framers of the Con-
stitution would see fit to grant "Congress . . . the power . . . to
establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-
out the United States.-" When the paramount jurisdiction of Con-
gress has been exercised in the enactment of a bankruptcy law, all
state bankruptcy laws are suspended in so far as they relate to the
same subject matter and affect the same persons as the federal bank-
ruptcy laws.281 Since Congress has extensively legislated in the mat-
20 Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 (1869) ; Bidlack v. Mason, 26
N. J. Eq. 23o (1875).
'Mitchell v. Cox, 2. Ga. 32 (i8s9).
222 SCHOUL.R, Wn.Ls, EXE cUToRS AND AmrxsTRAroas (5th ed. x9r5)
§ ox5 A.
=Ibid.
211 Cf: Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co. Ltd.), _-49 N. Y. 139, x63
N. E. 129 (1928).
3 Olmstead, The Development of the Bantkruptcy Laws (19z4) I Abr.
B. cxzmc Y IZEv. i.5. Cf: in re Johns, [i928] r Ch. 737 in which the court
refused to recognize an agreement, which, though it did not conflict with any
provision of the Bankruptcy Act, in effect, was to work an inequality among
creditors in case of bankruptcy.'
OLwST.AD, suipra note 25.
-' U. S. CONsTiTUTIo, Art. I, Sec. 2.
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 49 Sup. Ct. 1o8 (1929). Coltra: it
re Schultz, io6 Fed. 834 (S. D. Iowa 1901).
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ter,0 bankruptcy is today commonly conceived of as a "federal system
of jurisprudence created by the enactment of Congress by which a
debtor's assets are recovered and taken into custody and by which an
equitable distribution of these assets is made anongst the creditors on
a pro rata basis," 30 and by which, generally, a discharge of his debts
is granted to the bankrupt.
There are, however, two important types of situations that are
not governed by the federal Bankruptcy Act and are accordingly left
to state supervision. When Congress was given Dower to make uni-
form laws on bankruptcy, the term "bankruptcy" -carried a very defi-
nite connotation. The laws for the settlement of estates of deceased
persons,3" though they may provide for settling estates in the insolvent
course, have not been regarded as general insolvent laws 2 The
Bankruptcy Act does not and has never attempted to govern dece-
dents' estates.3 3 It is very doubtful whether Congress under the con-
stitutional authority vested in it, could ever extend jurisdiction to such
cases.3 4  Certain it is that this is a class of insolvency left at present,
at least, to state control. The second situation arises because the
federal act itself 35 provides that preference is to be given in federal
bankruptcy courts to "Debts owing to any person who by the law of
the state . . . is entitled to priority." 6
It is instructive to consider what would be the possibility of pref-
erences under state priority laws which provided "that residents of
this state shall have a priority in the distribution of assets or subjec-
tion of the same or any part thereof to ihe payment of debts over all
simple contract creditors being residents of any other country or coun-
tries," 3- in the light of some of the more important sections of the
Constitution apart from the restrictions of the federal Bankruptcy
Act.
'2 STAT. 19 (18oo), repealed 2 STAT. 248 (1803); 5 STAT. 440 (1841), re-
pealed 5 STAT. 614 (x843) ; 14 STAT. 517 (1867) repealed 2o STAT. 95(1878) ;
30 STAT. 544 (1898), II U. S. C. (1928) § I, amended 44 STAT. 666 (1926), II
U. S. C. (1928) § :-43.
2 Duberstein, Bakruptcy, in ISSAC, FACTs ABOUT BANERUPnCY, (1928)256.
' The same would seem to apply to any other fiduciary relationship, such
as guardian, of an infant or of a lunatic. See argument of counsel in Hawkins
v. Learned, 54 N. H. 333 (1874).
' Hawkins v. Learned, supra note si.
'However death does not abate proceedings that are already begun. 30
STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U. S. C. (1928) § 26.
In England since 1914, decedents' estates if insolvent are administered in
bankruptcy courts. 4 & 5 GEo. 5 c. 59, § i3o (I9r4).
M § 64 (7), 30 STAT. 563 (1898), ii U. S. C. (1928) § 104.
'Under this subsection a landlord's claim for arrears being entitled to
priority under state law is recognized in the federal courts. In re West Side
Paper Co., 159 Fed. 24r (E. D. Pa. "9o8). Likewise as to mechanics liens.
Hildreth Granite Co. v. rateroliet, x61 N. Y. App. Div. 42o, 146 N. Y. Supp.
449 (914).
'7 Cf: TExN. ANN. ConE (Shannon, 1913) § 2552.
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"Privileges and Immunities" Clause.38 The courts have not un-
dertaken to give any exact or comprehensive definition of the words
"privileges and immunities." Referring to this clause in Conner v.
Elliot,39 Curtis, J., said that it would be more in accordance with the
duty of a judicial tribunal to leave its meaning to be determined in
each case, upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied
therein. In Blake v. ZwfcClung,4" where the court ruled specifically on
a Tennessee statute,41 it was felt that preference to creditors of a
bankrupt was such a privilege as the Constitution sought to secure for
the citizens of all states alike so as not "to put a citizen of one state in
a condition of alienage when he is within or removes to another state,
or when asserting in another state the rights that commonly appertain
to those who are part of the political community known as the People
of the United States." And when the manifest purpose of the law
was to give to all local creditors priority over all creditors residing out
of that state, whether the latter were citizens or only residents of some
other state or country, it would appear that the majority of the court
was correct in finding that this amounted to a denial of equal protec-
tion to non-resident citizens.42 And obviously the result is correct,
even though the bankrupt is a foreign corporation, in the admission
of which a state may impose such conditions as it chooses,43 for as far
'U. S. CONSTITuTcOX, Art. IV, Sec. i (i). "The citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
states." By Amendment XIV it is provided that "all persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the
United States and the State wherein they reside."
D 18 How. 59i, 593 (U. S. i855).
to 172 U. S. 239 (1898) (Brewster and Fuller dissenting). For a further
development of the meaning of "privileges and immunities,"' see Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 43o (U. S. 187o); Slaughter House Cases, r6 Wall.
36, 77 (U. S. 1872) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 113, 114, xo Sul.
Ct 269 (x89o). See also Globe Bank v. Marting, 236 'U. S. 288, 35 Sup. Ct.
377 (1x4) (construing a Kentucky statute).
"S pra note 37.
"The dissenting justices argue that since a state may require of a cor-
poration that a specific fund be deposited with the state treasurer before ad-
mission, (as in case of insurance companies) to secure local policyholders, it
may also require a general mortgage on all the assets within the state as like
security. While this is true from the standpoint of the corporation, the real
problem arises whether these provisions can affect citizens creditors when the
assets of the corporation are to be distributed. It seems that there can be a
difference in the treatment of citizens of different states when there is a reason-
able relationship between such different treatments and the varying situations
of the persons. To require a mortgage on all assets of a corporation (that may
be scarcely subject to any state regulations) within a state, no matter' how
large the amount of the assets or how much out of proportion with the total
business done in the state, is to disregard such reasonable relationship. The
problem is somewhat analogous to security for costs in the case of non-resident
citizens.
" Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna., 125 U. S. 18r, I8, 8 Sup. Ct. 737 (888).
The same applies to the so-called "Mass. common law trusts" Hemphill v.
Orloff, 48 Sup. Ct 577 (1928).
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as the rights of citizen creditors of the corporation are concerned, a
state may not do indirectly what it could not do directly.
Although it is generally considered that a state may deal with the
property of a decedent as it sees fit so as to give preferences to local
creditors in the case of decedents' estates which are, in fact, insol-
vent, 4 the writer ventures the opinion that the decision of Blake v.
McChng 4; in respect to the rights of non-resident citizens in general
insolvency cases should also apply to decedents' estates. In view of
the fact that the privileges of citizens wherever resident, rest on a con-
stitutional guarantee, it does not seem to be material that the property
being distributed to creditors is from one source or another. While
there are no decisions directly on point, the conclusion seems irre-
sistible.
It is evident that an alien cannot invoke the protection of the
"immunities" clause in the Constitution, and it is likewise well settled
that a legal entity is not a "citizen" in the -sense in which the term is
used in the Fourth Article of the Constitution-so that it becomes
necessary to investigate other provisions of the Constitution as they
touch upon the general problem of priority established by the states in
case of insolvency, in order to determine whether a state may prefer
its citizens, in the distribution of the assets, to aliens and corporations.
"Equal Protection" Clause." It is now well settled that corpora-
tions are persons within the meaning of this clause.47 The inquiry
then becomes as to when a "person" is within the state's jurisdiction.
In Blake v. McClung 48 it is said "without attempting to state what is
the full import of the words 'within its jurisdiction! it is safe to say
that a corporation not created by the state nor doing business there
under conditions that subjected it to process issuing from courts of the
state is not, under the above clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
within the jurisdiction of that state." In a later case of Herndon v.
Chicago Railway Co.O the court in holding that a foreign corporation
came within the scope of the equal protection clause, said that "The
corporation was within the state, complying with its laws and had
acquired under the sanction of the state a large amount of property
within its borders and thus had become a person within the meaning
"Generally the statutes now in force do not so provide. Irr. Rnv. STAT.
(Cahill, i927) 6o; 2 MAss. GEN. LAws, (1921) 2171; PA. STAT. (West, 1920)
§ 8458; with which cf. Kansas Ry. Co. v. Cutler, i6 Kans. 568 (i876) ; Ky.
STAT. (Carroll, 7922) §3868.
"Supro note 40.
"0 U. S. CoNsoTiriox, Amendment XIV, "no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.
' Santa Clara County v. Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396, 6 Sup. Ct
ii32 (i885); Covington Turnpike v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 592, 17 Sup. Ct.
i98 (1896) ; Quaker City Cab v. Penna., 287 Pa. i6i, i34 Atl. 404 (7926). See
(1928) 77 U. or P. L. REv. :2o.
'3Supra note 40.
"o218 U. S. 135, 136, 30 Sup. Ct. 633 (1910). See also Southern Ry. Co.
v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 413, 30 Sup. Ct 387 (I910).
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of the Constitution and entitled to its protection." It is suggested5 0
that though nothing is said as to being subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state, the court meant to imply that the corporation
"which had entered the state with the state's consent and had been
allowed to acquire a large amount of property, had upon entering sub-
mitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts."
Under the power of a state, generally thought of as the power to
impose such conditions as it chooses before admitting within its
limits foreign corporations, the seemingly paradoxical query ought to
be raised as to whether the corporation may be within the jurisdiction
for the purpose of service and still be required to be outside the juris-
diction for the purpose of the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Home Insurance Co. v. Morse 1- it was held, in connection
with a related problem, that a statute, requiring a foreign corporation
as a condition of being permitted to do business within the state to
stipulate not to remove into the federal courts, suits brought against
them in the courts of the state, was unconstitutional. As a general
proposition, it would seem that a "state cannot constitutionally compel
a foreign corporation as a condition of doing or continuing to do busi-
ness in the state, to relinquish any rights secured by the Constitution
of the United States." 52
Although no definite test can be laid down as to when a "person"
is within the jurisdiction, still it is certain that aliens and corporations
not "within the jurisdiction" of the state cannot complain of the dis-
crimination against them in the distribution of an insolvent's estate
under the equal protection guarantee.
"Deprivation of Property without Due Process" Clause.ss For-
eign corporations and aliens cannot complain simply because their
claims are subordinated to the claims of local creditors, unless they are
being deprived of property. The right of property which the Amend-
ment protects includes the right to use property for any lawful pur-
pose or to acquire property by any lawful means? 4 The foreign cor-
poration or alien is not being deprived of its claim, which it may pur-
sue in that jurisdiction or any other where assets can be found. It is
only denied the right to participate upon terms of equality with local
creditors in the distribution of the property of another who has done
I BuRicK, AmEnICAx CoNsTiUo (1922) 27. In Kentucky Finance
Corp. v. Paramount, 262 U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636 (1922) (Holmes and
Brandeis dissenting), it was held that a corporation which went into the state
for the purpose of repossessing itself, by a permissible action in the court, of
specific personal property unlawfully taken out of its possession elsewhere and
fraudulently carried into that state, was within the jurisdiction for the purpose
of the undertaking.
1120 Wall. 445 (U. S. 1873). See Ducat v. Chicago, io Wall. 410, 415
(U. S. 1869) ; cf : Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 13 Sup Ct. 695
(1892).
= CoNFucr oF LAws IRESTAT .ENT (Am. L. Inst. 1927) 177.
' U. S. Co0sTTuTriox, Amendment XIV.
BURDICK, op. cit. supra note S0, at 513.
business in the state, and this does not amount to a deprivation of its
property.Y Since there is not a deprivation of property, it becomes
unnecessary to consider whether or not there has been "due process."
"Impairment of Contracts" Clause.'" This clause of the Consti-
tution is rarely involved in the consideration of the preferential cred-
itor statutes. Obviously, it can only be invoked in a case where the
claim in question arose from a contract made prior to the passage of
the statute.57  It is generally recognized that where a statute deals
only with the legal remedy, if a reasonable remedy is left, the obliga-
tion of the contract has not been impaired; so that the regulation of
priorities as between the creditors, if it leaves a reasonable remedy, is
not an impairment of the obligation of contracts. 8 It would seem,
however, that an arbitrary relegation of aliens and foreign corpora-
tions not within the jurisdiction of the state, to the end of the list of
creditors that are to be paid, whereas residents having the same types
of claims are given first preference is not leaving a reasonable remedy
to the former !lass and hence is an impairment of contracts. As has
been indicated, however, the cases in which the protection of this
clause can be sought are necessarily few in number.
Conclusions. In the distribution of a decedent's estate, it appears
that if the estate be insolvent, a state may prefer resident creditors to
aliens and foreign corporations not within the jurisdiction, with the
limited exception noted under "Impairment of Contracts"' And the
same is true in the case of bankrupt estates, despite the fact that the
federal government was given the power to control banjruptcies with
a view to establishing equality throughout the states, and these state-
created priorities must be recognized in federal bankruptcy courts.
No sound economic justification can be given for a.state law that
would take advantage of the opportunity open to it in this field.
Though in theory and legal contemplation each state is an independent
sovereign, it must be recognized that in commercial intercourse the
states are mutually dependent. It is provincialism of the narrowest
order which motivates a state to pass a law that looks only to the
monetary gain of its residents without regard to business conditions
in general and without concern for the proper balancing of equities
among creditors.
As far as preferences in decedents' estates are concerned, the
remedy where required seems to lie in an enlightenment of the state
legislatures. It should not be necessary to make a constitutional
amendment for a restricted class of cases. In the case of bankruptcy,
the effect of such laws as the Tennessee law "0 could be rendered
'Blake v. McClung, snpra note 40.
" U. S. CoNsTiTuTrox, Art. I, sec. 1o (i).
"Abilene Bank v. Commissioner, 228 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 409 (19m2).
,Oskosh v. Oskosh, 187 U. S. 437, 439, 23 Sup. Ct 234 (1903).
t'For concise and accurate analysis of the situations arising under the
Tennessee law see Marr, Bankruptcy Law Antmdments (1925-26) 2 Am. BANK-
RuPTCy RM. 41.
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nugatory, and priority based on provincialism defeated, by an amend-
ment to the present Bankruptcy Act providing that priorities granted
by state laws to its residents and domestic corporations over von-
resident aliens and foreign corporations shall not be recognized.0
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power
to regulate bankruptcy. If Congress feels it necessary, in the interest
of commercial regulations, to assume this power granted it by the
states, then it must assume at the same time the responsibility of pro-
viding legislation which breaks down the artificial barriers of state
lines. The amendment suggested will not only be founded on reasons
of equity, but will rest squarely upon a proper appreciation that prob-
lems of economic policy are not local but national in scope.
.F.
SERvCE op PROCESS ON FOREIGN CopoRATIONs-It is conven-
ient to divide the cases in this field into two categories: (I) those
which involve the jurisdiction of state courts over foreign corpora-
tions; (2) those which involve the jurisdiction of federal courts
under the diversity of citizenship clause, whether originally com-
menced in a federal court or removed from a state court. Within the
first class, it is well further to distinguish between the cases which
arose prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution and the development of the meaning of the "due process"
clause, and those which arose subsequently.
Prior to the development of the concept of "due process," the
question of state court jurisdiction was essentially a problem in con-
flict of laws, except where the case involved the "full faith and credit"
clause of the Constitution, in which instance, however, the courts
usually applied the principles of conflict of laws., The original rule
was that a corporation had no legal existence and could not be sued
outside the state of incorporation. 2 This rule was found to be
highly unsatisfactory because corporations in fact did business in for-
eign states, and it was inconvenient under such circumstances not to
be able to sue them where they were doing business. Accordingly,
most states passed statutes providing for service on foreign corpora-
tions under certain circumstances.3 The validity of such statutes,
'For general consideration of section, see ii U. S. C. A. (1927) §io4.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, i8 How. 404 (U. S. 1855) ; St. Clair v. Cox,
xo6 U. S. 350, i Sup. Ct. 354 (1882).
2 See the famous dictum of Taney, C. J., in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, E3
Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839). The reason for this attitude is evident when it is re-
membered that the law of private corporations was an outgrowth of the law of
municipal corporations.
ISee BEALE, Fo= ax ConpoRATIoNs (1904) 185, for the various statutory
regulations. The most common type of statute forbids the doing of business in
the state before the filing of a written consent to the jurisdiction of the courts,
together with a designation of persons on whom process may be served.
within the state enacting them, could not be contested. But their
validity was often sustained also under the "full faith and credit"
clause, on the theory that since the state had the power absolutely to
exclude foreign corporations, except those engaged in interstate com-
merce,4 it might make any provisions for service of process as condi-
tions to entrance, subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions. Such a view was dearly a reversal of the older view that the
corporation could have no existence outside the state of incorporation.
However, this theory was not completely satisfactory since it failed to
cover the case where service was upheld when the corporation had
not complied with the statute, but was actually doing business in the
state, or where the statute itself required no consent. Therefore, the
further theory has slowly evolved that since corporations are in fact
groups capable of being present at more than one place at the same
time, they are actually present in, and therefore subject to the juris-
diction of, the states in which they are doing business.
After the development of the "due process" clause, a new element
was introduced into the problem, namely, that in order to be constitu-
tionally valid the basis of state jurisdiction must be reasonable.7
Since that time two elements, then, are involved in the state decisions,
first, whether the facts on which jurisdiction rests meet certain basic
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, aid second, whether the
state statute imposes still further requirements for valid jurisdiction.
Of course, on appeal from a state court to the United States Supreme
Court, the sole question is one of "due process."
Where the case arises in the federal courts, or is there removed
on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the question is one of federal
jurisdiction and not state jurisdiction. Therefore, the federal court
may have jurisdiction even though the requirements of the statute in
the state from which the case has been removed have not been com-
plied with." The federal statutes conferring jurisdiction on the lower
'Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. i868). This exception must be
qualified today. See International Harvester Co. v. Ky., 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup.
Ct. 944 (1914).
See Merrill, Unconstittional Conditions (I929) 77 U. op PA. L. Rnv. 879.
'Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 17O U. S. ioo, IS Sup. Ct 526 (1897);
Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 24 N. f. L. = (853); see HEnERsoN, THE
PosTIoN oF FoRziGN CoiwonTioNs ir AEsrc&w CoxsrrruTioNA. LAW (I918)
77 et seq. The English cases also base jurisdiction upon "presence." Newby
v. Van Oppen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 293 (1872) ; Logan v. Bank [9o4] 2 K. B. 495.
" Goldey v. Morning News, i56 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559 (1895) ; River-
side Mlills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579 (1915). Cf. Kane v.
N. J., 242 U. S. x6o, 37 Sup. Ct 30 (x916) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 93, 47
Sup. Ct. 63z (1927) (non-resident motorist cases).
'Chatters v. Louisville R. R., i7 F. (2d) 305 (E. D. La. 1926). "If ac-
tions are started and removed into this court the sufficiency of the service
under the state law is still to be tested by the necessities required to give juris-
diction in an action instituted at the outset in the federal court. Goldey v.
Morning News (N. Y. 1895) 156 U. S. 518, 522, 15 S. Ct. 559, . . ." Vitkus
v. Clyde Steamship Co., 232 Fed. 288, 289 (D. C. N. Y. 1916). See 28 U. S. C.
§ 8r, pp. 657, 658 (1927).
MOTES 1011
1012 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
federal courts in general terms allow suits against foreign corpora-
tions only at the residence of the plaintiff in cases depending solely on
diversity of citizenship. 9 This allows the conferred jurisdiction of
the federal courts to rest largely on general principles of conflict of
laws subject only to the requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution that the assumption of jurisdiction be not
such as to violate the "due process" clause. From this analysis, it
seems that it may safely be said that the question whether a federal
court has jurisdiction in this type 6f case turns solely on the question
whether the foreign corporation has been reasonably served."0
How, then, has "due process" been defined in this field, or, to re-
phrase the problem, what are the facts on which jurisdiction may
reasonably be predicated? If the corporation actually consents to any
type of service, it would seem that jurisdiction may be acquired by
such service, at least to the same extent that jurisdiction over a private
individual may be acquired by his consent.' On the other hand, if
it does not consent, the courts have generally held that there are two
requisites to reasonable service. First, the corporation must be doing
business in the state."' What constitutes the doing of business is a
complicated question of fact which the Supreme Court has refused to
answer generally, preferring to decide each case on its own facts.13
Second, it is essential that service be made upon an agent of the cor-
poration who is sufficiently representative in character "that the law
would imply, from his appointment and authority, the power to receive
service of process." '- Statutes which designate some state officer are
constitutional if at the same time there is imposed upon him the offi-
The mere fact of removal to the federal court by a defendant corporation
does not constitute a general appearance so as to cure defective service of
process in the state court. See cases cited, 28 U. S. C. § 8x (24) (1927).
However, such defective service in the state court can be cured by new
service of process in the federal court, after removal. 41 STAT. 554 (1920),
28 U. S. C. § 83 (1927).
936 STAT. uioi (xgii), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (1926). Ex parte Schollenberger,
96 U. S. 369 (1877) ; Barrow Steamship Ca. v. Kane, supra note 6. However,
jurisdiction of the federal courts over foreign corporations in patent infringe-
ment cases is limited to the courts of the district where the infringement was
committed and where the corporation has a regular and established place of
business. 36 STAT. II00 (i9II), 28 U. S. C § io9 (1926).
"oFarmers! and Merchants' Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (E.
D. Ky. 1922). The Conformity Act (17 STAT. 197 (x872), 28 U. S. C. § 724
(1926)), though it has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction, and though
it does not bind federal courts to follow state practice as to service of process,
has generally induced a choice to follow that practice.
I Penna. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344 (9,7)
Smolik v. Phila. Coal Co., 227 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1x15) ; Bangon v. Phila.
Coal Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. i075 (I916).
a St. Clair v. Cox, supra note i; Goldey v. Morning News, m£pra note 7.
'z See St. Louis Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct 245 (913).
'Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, I9 Sup.* Ct. 3o8
(1899); Commercial Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 Sup. Ct. 445
(19o9) ; St. Louis Ry. v. Alexander, sufpra note 13.
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cial duty to notify the corporationys It has been suggested that these
two elements are not separate, but interrelated'a The problem is
analogous to service on a private individual. For personal jurisdic-
tion, he must be present within the state and service must be made on
him in such manner that it is reasonably likely to come to his attention.
There are further limitations in respect of the causes of action
which may properly be litigated under the service statutes without
violating the "due process" clause. Any cause of action arising out
of business done within the state may be sued upon. 7 Where the
cause of action has arisen out of business done outside the state, it
may be sued upon, provided the corporation has given actual consent."8
In the absence of such actual consent, it has been held that service on
a state official according to the service statute, in a suit involving a
cause of action arising outside the state, is denial of "due process," the
Supreme Court being of the opinion that the corporation would be
subjected to a hardship if it were obliged to defend all causes of action
in whatever state it may happen to be doing business.'0 It may well
be argued, however, that this hardship is wholly imaginary and that
the true test of "due process" is whether the corporation is likely to
receive adequate notice. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
the question whether or not jurisdiction could be had in the last situa-
tion by serving an actual agent of the non-consenting corporation
rather than a state official."0 If the hardship test be adhered to, that
fact variation warrants no difference in result; on the other hand. the
notice test, if that be adopted, would, as a practical matter be satisfied.
A recent case, Zendle v. Garfield Aniline Works, Inc., 21 held that
the retirement of the corporation from the state and the revocation of
its designation of process agents are ineffectual to defeat jurisdiction
over it, in actions upon causes of action arising within the state out of
business done there. Such is the great weight of authority.22 But
utual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct
707 (19o3). Statutes failing to impose such a duty were held bad under the
"due process" clause in King Tonopahi Mining Co. v. Lynch, 232 Fed. 485 (Nev
x1916), and in Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., 24z Fed. 543 (S. D. Cal. 1917).
"Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank, supra note iO.
I Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236
(i9o7); Simon v. Southern R. R., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (i915).
Upon the difficult matter of determining whether or not a cause of action has
arisen out of business done withi the state, see Osborne, "Arising ont of
Bisiness Done in. thw State" (1923) 7 MINN. L. Ray. 38o.
'sCases stspr note ii.
"Simon v. Southern R. R., mtpra note 17.
'Fry v. Denver, 226 Fed. 893 CN. D. Cal. I915) (service set aside).
Contra: Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 2o N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (917).
See generally, Fead, Jursdiction- over Foreign. Corporations (1926) MicH. L.
REv. 633.
'9 F. (2d) 415 (N. J. 1928).
M' utual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, supro note i3; American Ry.
Express Co. v. Royster Guane Co., 273 U. S. 274, 47 Sup. Ct. 355 (1927) ; Hill
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the rule has been strictly limited to deny its availability to those per-
sons who are not within the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted, namely, residents who dealt with the corporation when it did
local business.2 The immediate practical reason for this development
of the law is that the statutory remedy against foreign corporations
would be illusory if the corporation were at liberty to incur heavy obli-
gations in the state and then to retire with impunity. There is clearly
no objection under the "due process" clause in cases where the cor-
poration has actually consented, as in the Zendle case, by way of a
written designation of agency; an agency is irrevocable in cases where
it is founded on a contract with the state, made upon consideration
that the corporation should have the privilege of carrying on business,
and entered into for the benefit of persons suing on causes of action
arising out of such business.2 4  It appears to make no difference that
the extension of authority to receive service after retirement is not
express and must be implied from such words as "in any action." 2'
But if there is no consent and jurisdiction rests on presence, removal
necessarily precludes valid service.2 6  There is some difference of
opinion whether jurisdiction continues after retirement when the con-
sent extended only to corporate agents and does not include some
public officer.2 7  In view of the purpose of the statutes and the prob-
able tendency to enlarge their scope of operation, jurisdiction should
survive removal in this case, too; moreover, it is fair that the corpora-
tion sustain all the burdens incident to its own act tending to prejudice
the rights of creditors, including the burden of the possibility of non-
notification because of the intervening discharge of the corporate
agent.
D. M.
v. Empire Co., 156 Fed. i97 (C. C. Idaho ix7) ; Groel v. United Electric Co.,
69 N. J. Eq. 397, 6o Af. 822 (igo5); Kraus v. American Tobacco Co., 283 Pa.
146, I29 Ad. 6o (1925). On the other hand, two states have statutes which
have been construed to mean that retirement and revocation are effectual to
avoid service in all causes of action. Peoples Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 246 U. S. 83, 38 Sup. Ct. 233 (z918) (La.); United Power Co. v. Bridge
Co., 44 Mont. 343, xI9 Pac. 796 (i911). See Note (ig26) 45 A. L. R. 1447.
=Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 3z Sup. Ct. 127
(i9io); Chipman, Ltd. v. Jeffery Co,, 251 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920).
24 Collier v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assgn, i19 Fed. 617, 618 (C. C. W.
D. Ark. igoz) ; Moore v. Mutual Reserve, 129 N. C. 31, 33, 39 S. E. 637, 638
(i9oI). Some cases go further by finding implied terms in the contract be-
tween the corporation and the party seeking a remedy.
' Mutual Reserve v. Phelps, sup note 15, the leading Supreme Court
case, construed the statute in this fashion. Earlier federal cases refused to
imply an extension to suits after retirement. Swann v. Mutual Reserve, ioo
Fed. 922 (Ky. Igoo); Lathrop Co. v. Construction Co., iSo Fed. 666 (W. D.
N. Y. 19o7), -rez'd on other grouad, 215 U. S. 246, 3o Sup. Ct. 76 (zgog).
Conley v. Matheson Alkali Works, 19o U. S. 406, 23 Sup. Ct. 728 (x9o3).
Kirber-Bender Fire Escape Co. v. Chicago Beach Hotel, 16 Fed. 359
(C. C. A. 7th, i9o2) (agency held terminated). Contra: Brown-Ketcham Iron
Vorks v. Swift Co., 53 Ind. App. 630, ioo N. E. 584 (1913).
NOTES
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE OF MARKET ST. TITLE & TE. Co. V.
CHELTEN TR. Co.-A PROBLEm IN BILS AND NoTES-In the recent
Pennsylvania case of Market Street Title & Trust Co. v. Chelten
Trust Co.,' the plaintiff bank drew a check on itself, which was sup-
posed to be made payable to A. W. Sanson. By mistake the check was
made payable to S. W. Samson, who was non-existent. By a further
mistake it was directed and mailed to A. W. Sampson. An alteration
changed the name of the payee to read A. IV. Sanpson.2 The defendant
bank, noticing the alteration, took merely for collection the check gen-
erally indorsed "A. W. Sampson." The defendant thereupon indorsed
the check "Pay to any bank or banker. Prior endorsements guaran-
teed," and sent it to the plaintiff who paid the amount thereof to the
defendant, whose credit to Sampson was thereafter drawn upon in
full by the latter. The plaintiff discovered, fifty-two days after mak-
ing payment, that the check had been originally misdirected, and noti-
fied the defendant, who refused to make restitution. The court denied
recovery.
It is clear that this case does not fall within the category of "ficti-
tious payee" cases. Where the payee is non-existent or fictitious,
whether the instrument is payable to bearer is determined by the state
of mind and the intent of the drawer.3 If to the knowledge of the
drawer the person named as payee was non-existent, or if the drawer
did not contemplate that the existing person by that name should have
title, then, in view of his knowledge that there could be no indorse-
ment by the person named, he is held to intend that title to the instru-
ment should pass by delivery.' However, in this case the drawer
believed that the person named as payee was an existing person, and
intended that title should pass to such existing person. The instru-
ment was therefore not payable to bearer and title could not pass by
mere delivery.
A more serious problem is whether the principle of the "impos-
tor" cases can be extended to cover the principal case, so that the
sendee of the check may be said to have acquired title thereto. In the
typical "impostor" situation, the impostor, by fraudulently imperson-
ating another, induces the drawer of a check to make it payable to
himself in the name of the person impersonated, and to deliver it to
I Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided March i8th, 1929.
*The majority opinion as filed considers that the alteration changed the
name of the payee from S. W. Samson to A. W. Sampson. The dissenting
opinion considers the name as altered to be A. W. Sanpson. An investigation
of the paper books flied by counsel, and of the court record, shows that the
dissenting opinion is correct as to the fact.
=NEGoTmiAx IN5STRumENTS LAW § 9 (3); Montgomery Garage Co. v.
Manufacturers' Liability Insurance Co., 94 N. J. L. i52, Io9 AtI. 296 (1920);
Armstrong v. National Bank, 46 Oh. St. 512, 22 N. E. 866 (z889); United
Cigar Stores v. American Raw Silk Co., 384 App. Div. 2r7, 171 N. Y. Supp.
48o (I918), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 532, 129 N. E. 904 (1920).
' BRANNAN, NEGOABLE INsTRUmENTs LAw (Chafee's ed. 1926) 98.
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himself. The great weight of authority holds that in such a case title
passes to the impostor,' and that a holder in due course who takes
from the impostor may recover on the instrument against the drawee.
The drawer intended to make the check payable to the person before
him, even though he was mistaken as to the identity of that person
No distinction has been made in the majority of cases between a
manual delivery of the check by the drawer to the impostor and a
delivery to him by mail, after he has induced in the mind of the
drawer the belief that he is the person entitled to the money." The
refusal to make a distinction between the two cases seems reasonable.
In the latter situation, just as in the former, the mind of the drawer
goes out to the person to whom he mails it, so that he intends the
sendee to have title, even though he is mistaken as to the sendee's
identity.
It has often been said that the drawer in the "impostor" cases
has a double intent; that he intends, in the first place, to make the
check payable to the person before him, or at the other end of the line
of correspondence, and secondly, to make the check payable to the
person whose name appears thereon as payee; 8 and that the first intent
governs the passage of title because it is the "controlling" intent.0
Such an analysis, it would seem, is unnecessarily complicated. There
exists but a single intent-to make the check payable to the person
before the drawer, or, in the mailing case, to the person to whom the
check is sent. The other so-called intent is merely the motive of the
drawer, that is to say, the drawer intends to give and does give the
check to the impostor because he believes that the impostor is the per-
son entitled to it. The mere fact that he is mistaken in this belief
should not prevent the fulfillment of his intent, the passage of title to
the impostor.
The principal case presents a fundamentally different situation. In
the "face to face" cases there can be no doubt that the drawer's mind
goes out to the person before him so that he intends that person to be
payee. Similarly, in the "mail" cases, we can find that the drawer's
mind went out to the person who had previously by correspondence or
telephone conversation been established in the drawer's mind as the
person entitled to the instrument. Iowever, in the principal case
rLand Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Trust Co., 196 Pa. 230, 46 At.
420 (19oo), cff'd 211 Pa. 211, 6o Atl. 723 (19a5) ; Meridian Nat. Bank v.
First Nat Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N. E. 247 (1893) ; U. S. v. Nat Exchange
Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C. C. E. D. Wis. i891) ; Robertson v. Coleman, 14I" Mass.
23", 4 N. E. 619 (i886).
'Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Trust Co., Robertson v. Cole-
man, both supra. note 5.
7 Enmporia Nat Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Ian. 360, II Pam 141 (i886) ; Clark
v. Maloney, 6 uan. 82 (I87O). Contra: Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N. Y.
1876).
'BRANA-N, op. cit. supra note 4 at 2o8.
'BiAxxAN, loc. cit. supra note 8.
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there is no evidence at all to justify a finding that the drawer was ever
even made aware of the existence of Sampson.10 But the court de-
cided that there was an intent to make Sampson the payee and that
Sampson did get title to the check. It seems unfortunate that the
court should fail to distinguish this case from the ordinary "impostor"
case.
However even if it be conceded that Sampson had title, it would
seem that he did not, by his indorsement, pass title to the defendant,
because of the variance between the name of the payee and that in the
indorsement. It has been held that the spelling of the payee's name
and the spelling of the name in the indorsement must correspond
exactly in order that title may be passed to the indorsee.1 ' It has
been suggested that this holding has been superseded by the Negotia-
ule Instruments Law,':2 but such a suggestion seems unwarranted.
The Negotiable Iitstruments Law provides that, "where the name of a
payee or indorsee is wrongly designated or misspelled, he may indorse
the instrument as therein described, adding, if he think fit, his proper
signature." 13 There seems to be nothing in this section which pro-
vides that he may indorse by writing his correct name alone; and in
the absence of such a provision, it seems reasonable to construe the
words "may indorse the instrument as therein described" to mean
"must indorse the instrument as therein described."
The effect of the alteration is clear. An unauthorized alteration
in a material part of an instrument renders the instrument void, except
in the hands of a holder in due course.14 It is well settled that an
alteration of the name of the payee is a material alteration., The
defendant, because it admittedly had notice of the defect in the instru-
ment, was not a holder in due course, and the instrument was therefore
void in its hands. 6 It is evident, therefore, that the defendant could
not have recovered on the instrument had it sued the plaintiff, the
"See Slattery & Co. v. Nat. City Bank, 114 Misc. 48, 186 N. Y. Supp. 679
(i92o), where a check meant to be sent to a party in Oklahoma was sent by
mistake to a party of the same name in Texas, and the court held that the person
to whom the check was sent could recover thereon. The decision, is criticized
in (1921) 21 Co. L. R v. 576, and in BRAwAxZ op. cit supra note 4.
'Bolles v. Stearns, Il Cush. 320 (Mass. 1853). Here a bill was made
payable to, John P. Reed, and delivered to Joseph P. Reed, and indorsed Joseph
P. Reed. It was held that no title passed by such indorsement. The court con-
sidered that John P. Reed was the payee, and that the indorsement of any other
name was not the indorsement of the payee. It is more correct to say that
though Joseph P. Reed was the payee, he was payee in the name of John P.
Reed, and could pass title to the instrument only by an indorsement in such name.
" BRAxxAiw, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 82.
23NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 43.
"'NEGoTIAnB INSTRUMENTs LAW, § 24; Diamond Distilleries Co. v. Gott,
137 IKy. 585, 126 S. W. 131 (Ig9o).
I NzcoTims INSTRUMzENTs LAW, § 125-4; Hoffman v. Planter's Bank, 99
Va. 480, 39 S. E. 134 (igoi); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923).
'a NzGOTALE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 52-4.
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drawee. But, the money having been paid, it is necessary to ascertain
whether there is any theory upon which the plaintiff is entitled to
recover it.
In granting recovery to the drawee of an instrument on which
there has been an alteration, or a forged indorsement, the courts have
been confused as to the basis of such recovery. It has been held in
many cases that the indorsement on the check was an implied war-
ranty of the genuineness of the entire instrument, for breach of which
the drawee could recover. 7 However, an implied warranty is insep-
arably connected with a sale; and this theory of recovery seems -un-
sound, since whatever warranty is created by the indorsement extends
only to a subsequent holder Is and the drawee is not in that position.
Presentment for payment, and payment by the drawee, do not consti-
tute a negotiation or sale of the instrument, 9 so that, on principle, it
would seem unsound to find a warranty running to the drawee. The
indorsement by one who receives payment is merely a receipt for such
payment,2 0 and is not a guarantee to the drawee of the genuineness of
the instrument.
It has been held, however, that if the person receiving payment
expressly guarantees the genuineness of prior indorsements-which
guarantee has the effect of guaranteeing the genuineness of the entire
instrument,21 with the exception of the drawer's signature-a contract
of guarantee is thereby created which runs to the drawee.2- Such a
situation is presented in the instant case.
It is doubtful if it is any more correct to find that the holder of
paper may be liable on an express warranty than on an implied war-
ranty to the drawee. The very nature of a warranty seems to attach
it inseparably to a sale of the instrument, and the mere addition of
express words of guarantee to the signature of the indorsement, which
changes the warranty from implied to express, would not seem to
invest the acts of presentment for payment and subsequent payment
with the qualities of a negotiation or sale. However, if it be con-
'Interstate Trust Co. v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (19) ;
Central Nat Bank v. North River Nat. Bank 44 Hur 1s (N. Y. 1887);
Peoples' Bank v. Franldin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S. W. 716 (i889) ; BRADY,
LAW O FORGED AxD ALTRmED CuEcxs (1925) § 89; (1929) 4z HARv. L.
Rav. 411.
'NEGOTIABtE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§ 65-66.
"Nat Bank of Commerce v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat Bank, 87 Neb.
841, 128 N. W. 522 (1910); WOODVARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) § 8o;
Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (18g) 4 HIMv. L. RaV. 297, 302.
'WoowARp, loc. cit. supra note i9; Ames, mfpra note i9.
I Second Nat Bank v. Guarantee Trust Co., 2o6 Pa. 616, 56 At]. 72 (i9o3);
New York Produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 135 App. Div. 52,
L19 N. Y. Supp. 988 (I9o9).
=New York Produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank; see Second
Nat. Bank v. Guarantee Trust Co., both supra note 21. The view is adopted in
(1929) 42 IARv. L. RMv. 411. The New York case, the only one found directly
in point by the writer, relies on earlier New York cases which are not in point.
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ceded that the drawee may recover on an express warranty by the
holder, yet it must be found that the holder intended to be bound on
such a contract. It would seem that, in the instant case, there was no
such intent, in view of the fact that the check was indorsed in the
usual course of business, and that the stamp including the words
of express warranty was in all probability applied indiscriminately
to checks, whether they were intended to be subsequently negotiated,
or presented for payment. There could be no reason for such a war-
ranty by the defendant bank, since it definitely doubted the validity of
the check; and it would seem incongruous to hold that the defendant
guaranteed the genuineness of the instrument to the very person from
whom it was to determine whether or not the check was genuine.
Recovery by a drawee who has paid on a forged or altered instru-
ment is more accurately based on the quasi-contractual right to have
money returned which has been paid under an honest mistake of
fact.2 .3 It has been held in such a case that the drawee can recover
regardless of any negligence on his part in paying. However, a
change of position by the holder, in reliance on the payment, is a com-
plete defense against the action,25 unless the holder has himself been
guilty of negligence, and that negligence was the sole cause of the loss.,
However, where both the holder and the drawee have been negligent,
even though the holder's negligence was not the sole cause of the loss,
some courts have permitted recovery by the drawee.2 7  The better
view seems to be that recovery should be denied, and that the loss
should remain where it has fallen.
s
The instant case seems to come within the latter class. Though
the defendant changed its position in reliance on the payment by the
plaintiff, its negligence in not ascertaining the facts concerning the
check would have precluded the defense of change of position, had
not the plaintiff been negligent in not dtetecting the alteration when the
check was presented for payment. It has been held, where the drawer
'Espy v. Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604 (U. S. 1873); Redington v. Woods,
45 Cal. 406 (1873) ; Clews v. New York Banking Assn., 89 N. Y. 418 (x88z);
WooDvARn, loc. cit. snpra note i9.
I Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54 (1841) ; Lewellen v. Garrett, 58 Ind. 442
(1877); Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray 5i8 (Mass. 1855); Woon-
wARD, op. cit. supra note "g, § 15.
Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesmen's Bank, 173 N. Y. 272, 65 N. E.
ixo8 (19o3) ; WoomvAp', op. cit. supra note 19, § a$.
'Union Bank v. U. S. Bank, 3 Mass. 74 (x8o7); Phetteplace v. Bucklin,
i8 R. LI. 297, 27 At!. 211 (893); Koontz v. Central Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275
(1873). The decision in the latter case was not rested on the negligence of the
defendant
'Koontz v. Central Nat Bank, supra note 26, in which both parties ap-
peared to have been negligent, although the defendant was probably more negli-
gent than the plaintiff; Corn Exchange Bank v. Nassau Bank, 9T N. Y. 74
(1883) ; Bank of Toronto v. Hamilton, 28 Ont. 5i (i898). Contra: Crocker-
Woolworth Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (19o3); Hathaway
v. County of Delaware, x85 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153 (i906). "
'WooDwAR,, op. cit. supra note 1g, § 25.
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and the drawee of an instrument are the same party, that he is bound
to know all the facts concerning the instrument, and that no recovery
can be had from the holder after payment has been made, if it is later
discovered that the instrument was altered or forged.2" It seems en-
tirely reasonable to hold the party to this knowledge; there is no one
who is better able to know the true facts than the party who both
drew and paid the check, and the "vocational" duty imposed on the
bank in such case is consonant with the higher degree of care ordi-
narily required of banks. The refusal of recovery to the plaintiff in
the principal case accords with the better view that it is unconscionable
to shift the loss when both parties are at fault.
R.P.M.
U. S. v. Nat. Exchange Bank of Baltimore, I F. (2d) 888 (C. C. A. 4th,
1924) ; BRADY, op. dt. jupra note E7, § 86.
